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1. INTRODUCTION 
Drawing upon the theory of responsive regulation, in the 1990s 
the Australian Commissioner of Taxation ('the Commissioner') 
expressed the partnership model of tax administration. Shortly 
afterwards, the New Zealand Inland Revenue Commissioner joined 
this shift to (what has been cast as) the way forward in meeting the 
demands upon a tax administration in a modem, open democratic 
society. After something like a decade since the adoption of this new 
model of tax administration, it is appropriate to review its history, the 
challenges that have been encountered and also to reflect upon the 
prospects of the partnership model. The purpose of this article is to 
undertake this task and to suggest avenues for further critical 
reflection upon the operation of the partnership model with a view to 
its enhancement. 
Part 1 of this article identifies and elaborates upon the two 
models of tax administration that are evident in recent Australian and 
New Zealand history: the adversarial model and the partnership 
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model. Part 2 of the article reviews the drivers which prompted the 
paradigm shift in New Zealand and Australia from an adversarial 
model to a partnership model. Part 3 of the article identifies tensions 
within the partnership model and discusses the practical emanations 
of these tensions, evident in the operation of the partnership model. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Different Approaches to Tax Administration 
There are different approaches to conceptual ising the role of the 
tax administrator vis-a-vis tax advisers which emerge from different 
perspectives regarding the relationship between the individual and 
the state. From the perspective of liberal individualism, taxation 
might be seen to be a compulsory expropriation of a person's private 
property,l and so from this perspective the individual is entitled to 
minimise by legal means the extent to which the state 'puts its 
shovel' into the individual's store of wealth? 'Of course I am 
minimising my tax, and if anybody in this country doesn't minimise 
their tax they want their heads read', the late Kerry Packer famously 
opined in response to a question before a Senate Committee. From 
this individualist perspective, the ethical obligation of a tax adviser is 
to uphold the law, which means that the adviser ensures that their 
client pays no more tax than is required by law.3 The state is cast as a 
revenue maximiser pursuing its 'self-interest,4 or at least the 
self-interest of state agents.5 Thus, tax administrator and tax adviser 
1 For a critique of this mainstream characterisation of the nature of taxation, see 
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (2002). 
2 Re Vicars (deed) (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 85. 
3 See, eg, Geoffrey de Q Walker, 'Tax Complexity and the Rule of Law' in Peter 
Saunders (ed), Taxploitation (2006) 87. 
4 Geoffrey Brennan, 'Public Choice and Taxation: Leviathan after Twenty Years' in 
Richard Krever (ed), Tax Conversations: A Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax 
Reform Debate (1997) 87, 100. See also Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, 
The Power to Tax (1980) 26ff; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988). 
5 Sam Peitzman, 'Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting' (1984) 27 Journal 
of Law and Economics 181; D Mayhew, The Electoral Connection (1974); Monis 
Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (1977). 
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pursue mutually inconsistent objectives in an adversarial relationship 
akin to the relationship between opposing counsel in a common law 
system. Under this model, the tax authority would administer and 
apply the law with a view to maximising government revenue and 
pursuing government policy whilst the profession would seek to 
minimise the tax liabilities of its clients by employing tax planning 
techniques, asserting pro-taxpayer interpretations of the tax law, or 
both of the above. 
A vastly different characterisation of the relationship between tax 
administrator and tax adviser takes Rousseau's concept of the 
'general will' as its starting point. From this perspective, the 
individual and state are not a dichotomy but a unity framed upon a 
common identity.6 On this view, the tax administrator and the tax 
profession comprise a partnership which pursues fulfilment of the 
'general will' expressed in the community's tax laws. Such a 
partnership may experience friction, but the parties strive to 
minimise conflict and seek to achieve negotiated positions and 
'practical' outcomes consistent with the 'general will'. 
2.2 History 
The regulatory history of both the Australian Taxation Office 
('the ATO') and the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department ('the 
IRD') reflects the various regulatory theories. By the end of the 
20th century there were clear indications of dissatisfaction with the 
extant tax administration process in both Australia and New Zealand. 
In Australia, the Cash Economy Taskforce,7 the Ralph Review of 
Business Taxation8 and senior officers of the ATO openly 
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right 
(1762) bk I, ch 6. 
7 Australian Taxation Office, Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy 
(1998) 11. 
8 J Ralph, R AlbeIt and B Joss, Review of Business Taxation: A Tax System 
Redesigned - More Certain, Equitable and Durable (1999) 147 (calling for a less 
adversarial approach to dispute resolution). 
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contemplated a new direction in tax administration.9 Since then the 
transition to a model of cooperative compliance has not always been 
smooth: in 2002 the ATO's relationship with the profession reached 
an all time low. 10 However, such tribulations have only served to 
strengthen the apparent resolve of senior officers of the ATO to 
embrace a cooperative approach to taxpayers and their advisers. I I 
Such statements are not mere verbiage: there has been a 
demonstrable shift in the approach adopted by the ATO in its 
dealings with the profession. The type of information it gathers,12 the 
preparedness to publicly disseminate information germane to both 
taxpayer compliance and the accountability of the ATO,13 the 
breadth of its consultative arrangements with tax advisers l4 and also 
its efforts to ease the administrative burden of tax advisers15 are all 
indicative of this paradigm shift. 
9 See, eg, Michael Carmody, 'Future Directions in Tax Administration' (Paper 
presented at the Third International Conference on Tax Administration, Sydney, 
17 April 1998). 
10 For discussion of which see Australian National Audit Office, The Australian 
Taxation Office's Management of Its Relationship with Tax Practitioners, Report 
No 19 (2003). For the far more positive follow-up report, see Australian National 
Audit Office, The Australian Taxation Office's Management of Its Relationship with 
Tax Practitioners: Follow-Up Audit, Auditor-General Audit Report No 30 (2007). 
11 Discussed in Justin Dabner, 'Partners or Combatants: A Review of the 
Relationship of the Australian Tax Office with the Ta'( Advising Profession' (Paper 
presented at the 19th Annual Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, 
Brisbane, 23 January 2007). 
12 See, eg, Australian Taxation Office, Biannual Tracking of Tax Agents 
Perceptions' of Service and Usage of Channels: Wave 14 (October 2006) (2007) 
Australian Government <http://\vww.ato.gov.auiprint.asp?doc=/contentl0009l8l6. 
htm>. 
13 Australian Taxation Office, ATO Compliance Program 2006107 (2006). 
14 For an overview of many of the Commissioner's consultative forums, see 
Australian Taxation Office, Stakeholder Consultation Overview (2008) Australian 
Government <http://www.ato.gov.auidefault.asp?menu=6540>. At the time of 
writing, the most recent initiative is the appointment of senior regional 
representatives to consult with tax practitioners to discuss serious issues or systemic 
froblems. 
5 Recently reiterated by the Commissioner, Michael D' Ascenzo. See Michael 
D'Ascenzo, 'A Partnership Based on Trust and Respect' (Speech delivered at the 
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In terms of its relationship with tax advisers, on many occasions 
the ATO has expressed a desire to more fully establish a partnership 
approach with the profession. 16 For 2006-07, the A TO has included 
in its description of its compliance program a new section focusing 
entirely on how it sees its relationship with tax practitioners. 
Essentially the chapter is laden with commitments to continue to 
consult, co-design and co-operate in all dealings impacting on tax 
. . 17 practitioners. 
There are also clear signs that tax practitioners have reciprocated. 
Thus the President of the Taxation Institute of Australia commented 
in the Institute's journal of August 2006 that it was critical 'to foster 
an open and mature relationship with all levels of the A TO to ensure 
the best possible outcomes from our consultations' .18 
The experience in New Zealand would appear to be very similar. 
During the 1990s the relationship between the IRD and the 
profession became strained with both a Select Committee Report of 
1996 and a Finance and Expenditure Committee Report of 199919 
identifying problems in the relationship. Then, in 200 I, the IRD 
embraced the responsive regulation or compliance model/o 
National Institute of Accountants Board Meeting, Canberra, 8 May 2007); Michael 
D 'Ascenzo, 'Working with the Tax Profession' (Speech delivered at the 
22nd National Convention of the Taxation Institute of Australia, Hobart, 15 March 
2007); Michael D'Ascenzo, 'A New Relationship with the Tax Profession' (Speech 
delivered at the 21 st National Convention of the Taxation Institute of Australia, Gold 
Coast, 6 April 2006); Michael D'Ascenzo, 'Living Our Values' (Speech delivered at 
the 7th International Tax Administration Conference, Sydney, 20 April 2006); 
Michael D' Ascenzo, 'Relationships benveen Tax Administrators and Tax 
Agentsffaxpayers' (Presentation delivered at the Asia-Oceania Consultants 
Association General Meeting, Manila, 11 November 2005). 
J6 See the material cited at n 15, above. 
J7 Australian Taxation Office, Compliance Program, above n 13,72- 8. 
J8 Andrew Mills, 'President's RepOit: Tax Transparency - Consulting with the 
ATO' (2006) 40(8) Taxation in Australia 65. 
19 New Zealand, Inquiry into the Powers and Operations of the Inland Revenue 
Department, Pari Paper No 1.3 (1999). 
20 Discussed in Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand Inland Revenue: Annual 
Report 2006 (2006) pt 3. 
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established a taxpayers' Charter2 ! and in its five year business plan 
identified a cooperative future and reiterated its commitment to the 
compliance model and Charter.22 The following year it commenced 
an industry partnerships program23 and in 2003 received a favourable 
Auditor-General's report on its taxpayer audit strategy.24 
As part of these developments, the IRD began to nurture its 
relationship with the profession by projecting a more collaborative 
approach. In a speech by the Deputy Commissioner of Business 
Development and Systems in October 2003, the IRD acknowledged 
the change in the role being played by both it and the profession and 
the importance of working together.25 
2.3 Why the Paradigm Shift? Drivers for the Introduction 
of Responsive Regulation 
The significance of this paradigm shift in Australasian tax 
administration cannot be understated: it is exceptional by 
international standards. Mention of a tax administrator and tax 
adviser 'partnership' in Canada, for example, prompts a startled look 
followed by guffaws of polite laughter (and, perhaps, the unspoken 
thought of 'how strange these Antipodeans are'). 
21 Available at Inland Revenue Department, Our Commitment to the Community: 
Inland Revenue Charter (2008) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/commitmenti 
aboutir-charter.html>. 
22 Inland Revenue Department, Inland Revenue Business Plan: The Way Forward -
2001 Onwards (2001), recently updated in Inland Revenue Department, Inland 
Revenue Business Plan: Our Way Forward - 2006 to 2011 (2006). 
23 Discussed in Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand 1nland Revenue: Annual 
Report 2005 (2005) pt 3. 
24 Controller and Auditor-General, Report of the Controller and Auditor-General: 
Inland Revenue Department - Pelformance of Taxpayer Audit (2003). Also see the 
follow-up audit in Controller and Auditor-General, Inland Revenue Department: 
Performance of Taxpayer Audit - Follow-Up Audit (2006). 
25 Colin MacDonald, 'The Tax Profession' s Changing Interface with Inland 
Revenue' (Speech delivered at the 2003 Tax Conference of the Institute ofChmiered 
Acconntmlts of New Zealand, Christchurch, 10 October 2003). 
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What prompted such a dramatic shift in Australia and New 
Zealand when other tax administrations encountered similar 
difficulties but have not embarked upon such an ambitious 
reorientation? There will be many causes for such a change. 
Ideological background, the institutional environment, 'material' 
influences such as technological capacity, interest groups and 
individual policy entrepreneurs all simultaneously shape the 
perception of what is normal and what is possible, and therefore 
shape and stretch the tax administration at all levels across multiple 
sites. 
Detailed consideration of the causes of the introduction of the 
cooperative compliance model in Australasia is beyond the scope of 
this article. However, for the purposes of this article it is useful to 
identify the ideological significance of neo-liberalism during the 
latter part of the 20th century and its influence with respect to the 
adoption of responsive regulation. As with many 'isms ' , there are 
various definitions of neo-liberalism. However, for present purposes 
suffice to say that the 1980s saw a resurgence of the view that Adam 
Smith' s 'invisible hand' of the market should displace, wherever 
possible, the heavy hand of government regulation,z6 This view was 
in the ascendancy from the 1980s, when the centralised regulatory 
power of the welfare state was perceived increasingly to suffer from 
a legitimation crisis.27 The neo-liberal response to this perceived 
crisis was to argue that the nature and extent of state activity should 
be reduced, a view which was promoted by various well-funded 
lobby groups including, in Australia, the Institute of Public Affairs.28 
The purpose of this Part of the article is to lay the groundwork 
for the argument that responsive regulation was considered to offer 
the best model for mediating the conflicting imperatives of emergent 
26 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Milton Friedman, Freedom to 
Choose (1980). Friedrich Hayek's work was 'rediscovered' and is a prominent 
component of the neo-liberalliterature: Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (first 
fublished 1945, 2005 ed). 
7 See, eg, Friedman, Freedom to Choose, above n 26, chs 9-10. 
28 Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison, Silencing Dissent (2007). 
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neo-liberalism and maintenance of the fiscal foundations of the 
welfare state. These imperatives included tax system efficiency and 
tax system integrity. This is not to suggest that responsive regulation 
was an offshoot of neo-liberal ideology and nor was it necessarily a 
doctrine which was advocated by neo-liberals. Rather, the thesis of 
this Part of the article is that responsive regulation offered a response 
to the challenges of tax administration which was palatable to a 
broad cross-section of the community, including those who adopted 
the emergent neo-liberal discourse. However, in Part 3 of this article 
it will be argued that this synthesis of welfarist and neo-liberal 
visions within the one model of tax administration has engendered 
systemic instability. 
2.3.1 Neo-Liberalism and the Small State Imperative 
One aspect of neo-liberal discourse was a distrust of government 
and, hence, a preference for small government. In terms of tax 
administration, an extreme example of this neo-liberal preference for 
private markets over public regulation was apparently considered 
during the preparation of the British Conservative Party election 
manifesto of 1997.29 However, while such an extreme has not been 
adopted in Australia or New Zealand, the model of responsive 
regulation promised a pared back, efficient tax administration which 
expended fewer resources by promoting voluntary compliance with 
taxation laws. 
2.3.2 Open Government 
The distrust of government, and the perceived cnSIS of 
legitimacy which gathered strength from the late 1970s, contributed 
to calls for government which was more open and accountable.30 The 
29 David Hencke, 'Secret Plan to Sell Off Tax System' , The Guardian (London), 
28 January 1997, 1. The thrust of Hencke 's claim was denied by Conservative 
govelnment Ministers: 'No Tory Plans to Privatise Tax Man,' The Herald 
(Glasgow), 29 January 1997, 6. 
30 Thomas McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in 
the Federal Bureaucracy (1991) ch 2. 
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erstwhile faith in an underlying moral consensus uniting a society3l 
or the rationality of bureaucratic actors32 (or in both of these ideals) 
were no longer considered sufficient justification for letting 
regulators get on with their work of regulating. Across the political 
spectrum, there were calls for more open and accountable 
government, such that participants in the 'political market' (for 
example, electors) might make informed decisions regarding their 
political preferences.33 
From the 1970s the emergent neo-liberal discourse had 
challenged the role of 'unaccountable' bureaucrats in the creation 
and administration oflaw.34 Responsive regulation answered this call 
for open government by promising a regulatory process framed in 
terms of a partnership between regulators and the community.35 This 
partnership incorporated the participation of community 
representatives in regulatory processes and, moreover, entailed the 
provision of substantial information and assistance to members of the 
public in assisting them to understand and comply with the law. 
2.3.3 Global Tax Competition and Tax Administration 
Neo-liberalism has also prompted a reorientation of the 
perceived role of government as architect of the framework within 
which efficient private markets operate.36 Within this discourse, a 
31 Seymour Lipset, Political Man (1963). 
32 Founded upon Weber's proposition that bureaucratic rationality offered the 
strongest path to legitimation of state action: Max Weber, Economy and Society 
(1978) 973. 
33 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Citizens as Partners 
(2001). 
34 Geoffrey de Q Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional 
Democracy (1988); Geoffrey de Q Walker, The Tax Wilderness: How to Restore the 
Rule of Law (2004). 
35 As originally conceived, this entailed the adoption of a tripartite regulatory model 
involving regulator, regulatee and a community representative: Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) 
57-8. 
36 For a discussion of this point, see David Held, Models of Democracy (3 rd ed, 
2006) 170. 
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country's tax system is less the bureaucratic machinery of a 
sovereign state and more one facet ofa state's competition for global 
capital and human resources. Thus, the Ralph Review of Business 
Taxation specifically referred to global tax competition as one driver 
of business tax reform,37 while more recently a similar imperative 
was expressly referred to in the annOW1cement of New Zealand's 
International Tax Review.38 
In terms of tax administration, responsive regulation promised 
residents of foreign countries a lower tax risk with respect to their 
Australian or New Zealand income: as long as they had genuinely 
attempted to comply with the law they would not encounter 
unexpected, retrospective tax penalties. Threats of capital or human 
resource flight (or both) are therefore one driver of a non-adversarial 
relationship between the collecting authority and taxpayers or tax 
advisers. 39 
2.3.4 Emergence of Risk Management as a Supplementary 
Discourse to Legitimate Tax Administration 
A fourth reason for the shift in tax administration which can be 
attributed to neo-liberal ideology is the enhanced status of the 
discourse ofrisk management. Weber suggested that the modern age, 
having eaten of the tree of knowledge, sought legitimacy in 
rationalised bureaucratic action.40 However, it is doubtful that the 
legitimation of tax systems is based solely upon one narrative such as 
rationalised bureaucratic action. Rather, it is more likely that 
bureaucratic legitimacy is founded upon several pillars, with the 
morality of law (also referred to as 'substantive legitimacy'), legal 
formalism (embodied in the rule of law) and the neo-liberal discourse 
37 Ralph, Albett and Joss, above n 8, 9. 
38 New Zealand Inland Revenue Depatiment, New Zealand's International Tax 
Review: A Directionfor Change (2006) 1. 
39 There is evidence that punitive tax enforcement may encourage multinationals to 
move offshore. See Robett Lee, Where Tax Rates Fall, Multinationals Follow 
(2006) Tax-News.com <www.tax-news.comlasp/storylstoryyrint.asp?storyname= 
23681 >. 
40 Weber, above n 32. 
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of 'economic man' (embodied in the narrative of 'risk management') 
being three that are discernible in the official literature. 
2.3.4.1 Substantive Legitimacy 
The narrative of substantive legitimacy asserts an ethical 
obligation to pay tax, framed in terms of taxes being what we pay for 
a civilised society41 and also 'paying a fair share' .42 However, for 
this narrative to generate legitimacy there must be a consensus on 
what a civilised society means or what a 'fair share' means 
(assuming that 'fair share' has a meaning independent from that 
demanded by law). However, although there was a widely held 
perception of social consensus during the 1950s and 1960s,43 this has 
been displaced by alternate political theories which take as their 
starting point some version of systemic dysfunction or 
disequilibrium. In no small way, the individualism which underpins 
the neo-liberal critique of the modern welfare state added significant 
momentum to this late 20th century angst regarding the excesses of 
the state in promoting a particular social vision. This is not to say 
that claims of substantive legitimacy of tax systems have been 
discarded, but rather that such claims do not win universal assent and 
therefore form an inadequate foundation for legitimacy and hence 
voluntary compliance. 
2.3.4.2 Rule of Law and Source of Legitimacy 
The second source of bureaucratic legitimacy can be found in the 
rule of law discourse. Despite continual challenge to the validity of 
premises underpinning the rule of law, the assumption of determinate 
law continues to underpin the rule of law and the rule of law remains 
the dominant legal discourse. It may be that the prospect of 
indeterminate law, anathema to liberal legalism, is just too horrific 
41 A recent judicial expression of this proposition may be found in Spotless v 
Federal Commissioner a/Taxation (1996) 96 ATC 5201, 5206. 
42 Michael D'Ascenzo, 'Creating a Community First Culture in the Tax Office' 
(Speech delivered to the Australian Public Service Commission Leadership 
Development Network, Canberra, 15 November 2006). 
43 See, eg, Li pset, above n 31. 
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for the collective psyche to contemplate: we want to believe in the 
neat ordering of the social world under the rule of law. Here, the 
hand of neo-liberalism may be discerned: determinate law applied 
prospectively is one of the preconditions to efficient allocative 
decisions made within private markets. It is therefore no surprise that 
tax administrations affirm their role as law appliers rather than law 
makers: their job is to apply ' the law' without fear or favour. 
However, by the late 20th century the descriptive validity of these 
justifications for bureaucratic action had come under challenge. The 
existence of administrative discretions,44 the propensity of tax 
administrators to wield big sticks upon ordinary taxpayers while 
treating well-resourced taxpayers more flexibly45 and the perceived 
unfairness of such rationalised justice46 all pointed to a reappraisal of 
the role of bureaucratic rationality grounded upon the rule of law. 
Responsive regulation promised to restore the rule of law by 
enabling tax officers to select the most appropriate device for 
achieving the legislative purpose. Thus, for those who adhere to the 
rule of law and who accept that the legislative purpose underpins an 
acceptable interpretation of that rule, responsive regulation offered a 
desirable administrative strategy. 
2.3.4.3 Risk Management 
However, for others who had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the 
rule of law with its assumption of legal determinacy was less 
satisfying as a justification for bureaucratic action. A modern 
application of Weber's thesis would suggest that tax administrators 
would strive to promote legitimacy by extolling their 
professionalism. Here, the neo-liberal preference for private markets 
as efficient resource allocators can be discerned in the emergent 
bureaucratic discourse of risk management and meta-risk 
44 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, An Assessment 
of Tax (1993); de Q Walker, Rule of Law, above n 34; de Q Walker, Tax Wilderness, 
above n 34. 
45 Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle (1986). 
46 New Zealand Inland Revenue Department, Taxpayer Compliance, Standards and 
Penalties (2001). 
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management.47 On this view, tax administration is legitimated less in 
terms of applying the rule of law and more in terms of efficiently 
managing risk. Thus, tax administration is no longer about 
'collecting every last cent', but rather about maximising returns upon 
public resources allocated to the tax administration function. 48 
From this risk management perspective, the appeal of responsive 
regulation is the promise of administrative cost savings and 
efficiency, notwithstanding a possible loss of some tax revenue.49 
This efficiency can be achieved at a number of levels. First, the 
profession might take a less aggressive approach to advice resulting 
in less leakage of tax revenues. Second, celiain functions 
traditionally exercised by the administrator might be effectively 
delegated or outsourced to the profession. On the other hand, the 
profession might justify such an approach for their clients on the 
basis of a compromise between the costs of a possible dispute with 
the tax authority and the desire to minimise tax payable. 
However, this nanative of risk management cannot, of itself, 
sustain legitimacy. This is because the flexible administration which 
it embodies threatens to undermine public confidence in the integrity 
of the tax system. The adoption of risk management as a tax 
administration tool therefore means that the general public must also 
assume a risk management outlook in overseeing the administration 
of its tax system. The incorporation of risk management within the 
discourse of tax administration can therefore be expected to prompt 
public demands for enhanced transparency and accountability as the 
general public seeks to manage its risk in the form of threats to tax 
system integrity. 
47 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and 
Democracy (2002). For a discussion of the application of Parker's work in the 
context of taxation law, see John Braithwaite, 'Meta Risk Management and 
Responsive Regulation for Tax System Integrity' (2003) 25 Law and Policy 1. 
48 Financial Management and Accountability Act 1996 (Cth). 
49 However, some would suggest that the more conciliatory approach adopted by the 
ATO in recent years has and will continue to lead to greater tax revenues: 
'Carmody's Softly Softly Approach Delivers Windfall', Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 27 June 2006, 36. 
120 JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN TAXATION 
THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL 
3. ISSUES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL 
In the preceding Part, the ideological drivers for the introduction 
of the responsive regulation model were noted. It was argued that 
responsive regulation was perceived to offer the most appropriate 
way forward for tax administrators confi'onting an array of often 
conflicting pressures. The purpose of this Part is to critically reflect 
upon the challenges which must be addressed if responsive 
regulation is to live up to its promise. In earlier papers, the writers 
have explored the issues that arise with the partnership model in the 
Australian context.50 These issues are summarised in the following 
paragraphs. 
3.1 Do the Partners Share a Common Interest? 
The notion of a partnership suggests that the partners are in 
pursuit of a common interest. This common interest might arise 
because the partners share a common moral standpoint such as 
'paying taxes is a good thing to do' or because they agree upon the 
meaning of the law and share an interest in seeing that meaning 
fulfilled. 
3.1.1 A Common Moral Standpoint? 
Although there are many who subscribe to the existence of an 
underlying communal consensus (for example, Rousseau's concept 
of the general will or Lipset's moral consensus), the existence of 
such consensus is contested. In particular, some strands of 
neo-liberalism adopt a strong view of individualism in arguing that 
taxation imposed under laws made without the consent of the 
particular taxpayer is theft.51 This individualism limits the prospect 
;0 See, eg, Dabner, above nIl. 
51 See, eg, Eric Mack, 'Self-Ownership, Taxation, and Democracy: A Philosophical-
Constitutional Perspective' in Donald Racheter and Richard Wagner (eds), Politics, 
Taxation, and the Rule of Law (2002) 9; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974). For a discussion of the vicissitudes of this discourse, see Marc Linder, 
'Eisenhower-Era Marxist Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate 
Reduction for the Rich' (1996) 70 Tulane Law Review 905. 
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of any 'thick' social consensus upon the common will because it is 
most unlikely that universal consent will be achieved in relation to 
taxation. 
This conflict is evident in the literature regarding tax ethics, 
where the nature of the profession's obligation to the tax system is a 
vexed question.52 In this domain, it is generally accepted that tax 
advisers are ethically obligated to ensure that they uphold ' the law'. 
However, for the reasons noted below, there is no universally 
accepted interpretation of what such an injunction entails, 
particularly in cases of uncertain or indeterminate law. Indeed, a 
review of the ethical standards applicable to those fulfilling tax 
adviser functions demonstrates considerable variance in the wording 
of ethical rules across different types of adviser function53 and also 
across different jurisdictions. Thus, for example, the United States 
manual on tax practice standards acknowledges the distinction 
between an advocate, whose paramount duty is to zealously represent 
a client, and an adviser, whose pursuit of their clients' interests may 
be constrained by a duty to see that the tax system is not improperly 
used by the taxpayer. The relative weightings of the conflicting 
interests may, thus, depend upon the exact role being played by the 
adviser.54 Further, the nature of ethical standards adopted by different 
professional bodies varies.55 This debate regarding ethical standards 
;2 Discussed in Dabner, above n 11. At least one New Zealand tax practitioner does 
not believe that it is in the domain of a tax adviser to consider the morality of a 
transaction: David Simcock, 'The Tax Professional: Responsibilities and Exposures' 
(1994) 28 Taxation in Australia 549. Celiainly, the New Zealand Law Society 
ethical rules would appear to confirm the view that there is no obligation to the tax 
system. 
; 3 Functions range from preparing tax returns and managing tax audits through to tax 
planning and dispute resolution. Furthermore, the profession itself is eclectic, 
ranging from tax agents and suburban accountants through to international tax 
advisers, tax lawyers and tax barristers. 
;4 Bernard Wolfman, James Holder and Kenneth Harris, Standards of Tax Practice 
(5th ed, 1999) [49]- [52]. 
;; Maria Italia, 'Ethics and Tax Practitioners: Accountants and Lawyers' in C Evans 
and A Greenbaum (eds), Tax Administration: Facing the Challenges of the Future 
(1998) 281-2 (arguing that accountants' ethical obligations serve to constrain their 
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has come to the fore in Australia recently, with the debate over the 
Commissioner' s proposed 'dob-in' line for tax agents56 and the issue 
of the draft code of professional conduct.57 Tax advisers argue that 
their fundamental obligation must always be to their clients and it is 
inconceivable that they could also act as the Commissioner's spy. 
If it is, indeed, the case that tax advisers' obligations to uphold 
the law should be interpreted from an individualist standpoint, then 
'upholding the law' means assisting the client to further their 
individual interest by minimising their tax liability while remaining 
'within the law'. Although this might be considered selfish and 
lacking in public spirit, for those who at least express an acute 
sensitivity to the threat of state oppression, keeping the state to its 
proper amount of tax is in the public interest because it serves to 
constrain state 'interference' in private markets. Such an outlook 
does not bode well for partnership relations if the tax administrator 
tax planning role, by contrast to lawyers' more general and adversarial planning 
standards). 
56 Referred to in Michael D'Ascenzo, 'The ATO's Approach to Tax Administration ' 
(Speech delivered at the Taxpayers Australia and Superannuation Australia Annual 
Conference 2006, Sydney, 10 November 2006). This met with resistance from 
elements of the profession: Elizabeth Kazi, 'Tax Dob-in Line on Hold', The 
Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 27 November 2006, 1; Editorial 'ATO 
Needs Better Laws, Not Informers', The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 
9 October 2006, 70. Nevertheless, the ATO subsequently implemented the initiative 
with the Commissioner at pains to emphasise that it was the profession's idea in the 
first place: Michael D' Ascenzo, New Integrity Phone Service for Tax Agents (2007) 
Australian Government - Australian Taxation Office <www.ato.gov.auiprint.asp? 
doc=/contenV00093540.htm> at 27 February 2007. But see Elizabeth Kazi, 'Tax 
Agents Wary of ATO's "Dob-in" Line' , The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 
28 Februaty 2007, 8. 
57 This code is part of the proposed new tax agents regime issued for comment in 
May 2007. See generally Treasury, Exposure Draft Tax Agent Services Bill, Related 
Regulations and Explanatory Material (2007) <http://www.treasury.gov.aui 
contentitem.asp?Navld=037&ContentID=1218>. The code is to be established by 
proposed s 604-10. This provision contains motherhood statements that could be 
interpreted as stating a stronger obligation on tax practitioners towards maintaining 
system integrity. See also Michael D' Ascenzo, 'Do Professionals Have an Ethical 
Compass and Does It Matter?' (Speech to the Victorian Tax Bar Association, 
Melbourne, 29 March 2007). 
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adopts a revenue maximising stance. It also raises doubts as to the 
motives of tax advisers who purport to embrace the partnership 
model. 
On the other hand, if the ethical obligation to uphold the law is 
taken to impose an obligation on the profession to assist the tax 
administrator in maximising government revenue, this entails a 
narrow reading of the duties of loyalty and confidentiality of tax 
advisers to their clients. 58 
3.1.2 A Shared Understanding of the Law's Meaning? 
Acknowledging that the 'partners' may not share a common 
moral standpoint does not necessarily spell the end for the prospect 
of a tax partnership. Drawing upon various liberal legalist theories of 
law, the partnership model might be grounded upon a common 
interest framed in terms of upholding formal legal justice. That is, it 
might be contended that the partners share a common interest in 
ensuring that the' correct' amount of tax is paid. 
3.1.2.1 Indeterminate Law? 
However, this contention assumes that there is, in fact, a 
'correct' amount of tax payable that can always be identified, a 
proposition which is hotly contested. The meaning of taxation law is 
not just uncertain, it is indeterminate. It is indeterminate in the sense 
that no one can declare that they have found the right answer such 
that all other possible interpretations are obviously flawed. Only in 
such circumstances might a critical consensus emerge. Such 
indeterminacy arises because different interpretative methodologies 
58 The conflicting demands on tax agents and the need to provide them with greater 
guidance and protection if a partnership relationship with the ATO was to be 
progressed were the findings of Pauline Niemirowski and Alexander Wearing, 'Do 
Australian Taxation Office Staff and Compliant Taxpayers Identify with Tax from 
the Same Perspective, or are There Significant Degrees of Separation?' (2006) 9(2) 
Journal of Australian Taxation 119. 
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or different interpretative standpoints (or both) might be adopted.59 
Although we live in an era where the purposive rule of statutory 
construction purportedly enables us to identify the true legal 
meaning, there are good reasons to question this proposition. There 
are different understandings of 'legislative purpose' and in many 
cases the legislative purpose is vaguely stated. The Australian small 
business capital gains concessions, for example, are said to have 
been enacted in order to 'reduce the tax burden of small business' 
and to simplify the law. Such statements of purpose offer no 
assistance in determining the meaning of 'retirement' for the 
purposes of s 152-105 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) 
('the ITAA97').60 
Judges arrive at different interpretations of statutes simply 
because there are so many alternate paths which they might choose 
to follow in identifying what they consider to be the meaning of 
legislation. Taxation laws, then, are inherently ambiguous and 
opportunities for dispute as to the tax payable arise in all but the 
simplest tax profiles.61 The reality is that only a portion of these 
disputes is identified or litigated for all sorts of reasons: the matter 
might not come to the attention of the tax administrator, taxpayers or 
tax administrator (or both of them) might decide to ignore the matter, 
or some strategic interpretation might be adopted by the tax 
administrator which obviates dispute with respect to a particular 
matter. Even if it is conceded that the meaning of the law is 
indeterminate in just some instances, conceiving of a common 
interest in terms of identifying the 'correct' amount of tax is 
misconceived. 
59 Mark Burton, 'Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of Tax Law: Time to 
Reconsider the Commissioner's Model of Cooperative Compliance?' (2007) 5(1) 
eJournal of Tax Research 71. 
60 See, eg, Board of Taxation, A Post-Implementation Review of the Quality and 
Effectiveness of the Small Business Capital Gains Concessions in Division 152 of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997: A Report to the Treasurer (2005) 4. 
61 M Burton, 'The Rhetoric of Tax Interpretation: Where Talking the Talk Is Not 
Walking the Walk' (paper presented at the l7th Annual Australasian Tax Teachers 
Association Conference, Wellington, 27 January 2005). 
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3.1.2.2 Determinate Law but We Are Uncertain about What the 
Law Is 
However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that there is 
one correct meaning of the taxation law 'out there', awaiting 
discovery by a superhuman judge such as Dworkin's Hercules.62 
Does that make a difference in terms of the partnership model? The 
short answer is 'no', because even Dworkin admits that Hercules is 
superhuman.63 This means that in our second best world there will be 
at least some cases where the 'partners' will disagree about the 
appropriate interpretation of particular legislation. Even if they agree 
that they are both seeking the 'right' statutory meaning, and even if 
they agree upon the same interpretative standpoint and methodology, 
it is reasonable to expect that they will inevitably disagree in at least 
some cases about the appropriate outcome. For example, although 
the Commissioner has already adopted a generous reading of 
ITAA97 s 152-105,64 there will be those who will continue to press 
their self-interest by, for example, arguing that the disposal of an 
asset well in advance of actual retirement is nevertheless 'in 
connection with retirement' . 
3.2 Problems Raised by Conflicting Interests 
3.2.1 The Continuation of Adversarialism 
The existence of conflicting interests within the partnership 
destabilises that partnership, as instances of adversarialism on both 
sides threaten the development of trust. Such instances of 
adversarialism can be overt, as in the case of the Commissioner' s 
response to the decision in Essenbourne Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation,65 a response which recently attracted 
strong criticism from the Full Federal Court in Federal 
62 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). 
63 Ibid 265. 
64 Australian Taxation Office, Advanced Guide to Capital Gains Tax Concessions 
for Small Business (2006). 
65 2002 ATe 5201. 
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Commissioner of Taxation v Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) 
Pty Ltd.66 Similarly, this adversarialism is evident in taxpayers 
'playing for the grey' .67 
Adversarialism can also be more subtle, as in the case of the 
understanding of 'compliance' adopted for the purposes of the 
cooperative compliance model. This understanding of compliance 
also reflects an essentially neo-liberal worldview. Neo-liberalism 
places considerable faith in individuals to ensure that they are 
adequately informed before making resource allocation decisions. 
This assumption of individual responsibility underpins the defensive 
outlook of tax administrators in framing the tax compliance 
discourse. In the context of tax administration, the assumption that 
individuals know how much to invest in managing their tax risk 
means that the tax compliance literature has, almost invariably,68 
focused upon taxpayer under-compliance and ignored taxpayer 
over-compliance because taxpayers are assumed to ensure that they 
pay no more than is required by law. 
The taxpayer compliance literature is therefore framed in terms 
of identifYing the technologies for recovering revenue that would 
otherwise be lost by, for example, promoting taxpayer voluntary 
compliance. In this regard, the perceived failings of the erstwhile 
'adversarial' approach encouraged consideration of alternate models 
of tax administration which better assured the protection of the 
revenue. It is therefore no coincidence that the pyramidal depiction 
of responsive regulation focuses upon strategies for dealing with 
taxpayer non-compliance: the base of the pyramid is the compliance 
baseline beneath which it is assumed no taxpayer goes. However, the 
66 2007 ATC 4236, discussed in Elizabeth Kazi, 'ATO Drops Aggressive Legal 
Tactics', The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 6 March 2007, 1; Elizabeth 
Kazi, 'Ruling May Go beyond the Fringe', The Australian Financial Review 
(Sydney), 6 March 2007, 6. 
67 Doreen McBarnet, 'When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From 
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude' in Valerie Braithwaite (ed), Taxing 
Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (2003) 229. 
68 There are two exceptions of which we are aware. One is empirical research 
reported in J Roth, J Scholz and A Witte, Taxpayer Compliance (1989) vol 1, 51--4. 
(2008) 11(2) 127 
M BURTON & J DABNER 
literature which has recorded evidence of taxpayer over-compliance 
suggests that the responsive regulation model should be diamond-
like. Under this diamond model, the top half of the diamond would 
be the existing compliance pyramid. The bottom half of the diamond 
would essentially be a mirror opposite to the top half, but with one 
crucial difference. By contrast to the reference to enforcement 
strategies in the top half of the diamond, the bottom half would refer 
to increasing strategies for preventing overpayment of tax. Adoption 
of the pyramidal form in the responsive regulation model, in spite of 
evidence of taxpayer over-compliance, therefore might be one 
illustration of Levi's theory of predatory rule.69 
3.2.2 Power, the Rule of Law and Public Accountability within the 
Partnership Model 
3.2.2.1 The Presence of Power in Tax Administration 
The failure to appreciate that there is not necessarily a 'correct' 
view of the taxation laws challenges the partnership model. 
Moreover, it also exposes a weakness in the theory supporting 
voluntary compliance and responsive regulation. When the theory 
speaks of encouraging taxpayers to voluntarily comply to pay the 
'correct' amount of tax, what it means is that the tax administrator is 
seeking to achieve voluntary compliance with its interpretation of the 
taxation laws, or at least the interpretation of the taxation laws which 
it is prepared to accept. Rather than the tax administrator merely 
being the neutral, disempowered oracle for the legislative voice, it 
exercises power in wielding its interpretative discretion. 
69 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988) 3 (,Rulers are predatory, in the sense 
that they are revenue maximisers ' ). Notably, the Irish Revenue Commissioners have 
been urged by a parliamentary committee to devote more resources to ensuring that 
all tax reliefs are claimed, on the basis that the Commissioners have an equal duty to 
ensure that reliefs are claimed as well as tax is paid: Joint Committee on Finance and 
the Public Service, Houses of the Oireachtas, Interim Report on under-Claiming of 
Tax Credits, Allowances and Reliefby Taxpayers (2007). 
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3.2.2.2 Administrative Interpretative Power and the Rule of Law 
This is not to say that the tax administration autonomously 
determines its interpretation of a pm1icular rule and imposes it 'from 
above', as a centralised model of state power would suggest. Rather, 
all sorts of 'external' influences shape and interact with the 'internal' 
processes, ideas and institutions of the tax administrator to the extent 
that the internal-external dichotomy inaccurately depicts the social 
reality.7o It is difficult to see, for example, successive favourable 
administrative rulings regarding artificial schemes designed to 
generate favourable treatment of superannuation as anything but an 
example of the ATO internalising a desire to promote retirement 
savings by turning a blind eye to the potential application of the 
general anti-avoidance rule.71 A fundamental limitation of the 
partnership model, then, is the failure to take account of the fact that 
the partnership is not grounded upon determinate law. This is 
significant because the relationship of the partners revolves around 
the discretionary exercise of state power; in some cases the tax 
administrator will have the upper hmld, while in other cases the 
taxpayer will have the upper hand. 
However, it is unlikely that this rule of law discourse will be 
jettisoned any time soon, primarily because it is extremely beneficial 
to tax administrators in protecting the apparent impartiality of their 
function,72 and so frequent references to the role of tax administrators 
as mere rule appliers rather than rule makers can be found. 73 In 
practice however, and for the reasons noted above, the administrator 
70 Bruno Latour, 'The Powers of Association' in J Law (ed), Power, Action and 
Belief A New Sociology of Knowledge? (1986) 264. 
71 See, for example, the lenient treatment of superannuation recontribution strategies 
which are generally kno\>.'11 as the superannuation magic pUdding: Australian 
Taxation Office, 'Guidance on Recontributions to Superannuation' (Press Release, 
4 August 2004). 
72 Michael Carmody, 'Administering Australia's Tax System' (Speech delivered at 
the Monash University Law School Foundation Lecture, Melbourne, 30 July 1998). 
See also George Megalogenis, 'Cheats Lobbying Politicians to Pressure the ATO', 
The Australian (Sydney), 31 July 1998, 5. 
73 Australian Taxation Office, Integrity Framework (2006) 8. 
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has some discretion in determining the appropriate interpretation of 
the relevant statute. The intersection of this interpretative discretion, 
the professed adherence to the rule of law and also the partnership 
model generate several nodes of tension. 
3.2.2.3 Administrative Interpretative Discretion and the Prospects 
of Partnership 
Although it is clear that the general law concept of partnership is 
not directly applicable to the 'partnership' between taxpayers and tax 
administrators, the general law understanding of partnership does 
reflect the common understanding of the partnership concept. The 
essence of partnership law is that the partners owe duties as between 
themselves, in particular a duty of good faith. In the context of a 
taxation partnership, for example, how should an administrator 
administer an ambiguous tax provision where, on the most likely 
interpretation of the provision, it would have what the tax 
administrator accepts is a draconian and harsh operation? Should it, 
as part of its partnership obligations, administer the law to achieve 
what it considers to be a substantively 'fair' result? Or is it bound to 
give effect to the most likely interpretation which complies with 
formal notions of justice (such as a 'purposive' construction, despite 
the difficulties of ascertaining the legislative purpose in many cases) 
and which, coincidentally, maximises government revenue? In either 
case, is it bound to advise the government to remove the inequity or 
does that go beyond its role of applying the law? 
3.2.2.4 Accountability 
In order to address legitimate concerns regarding unintended or 
mischievous legislative consequences identified by its partner, the 
tax profession, the tax administrator needs to be able to exercise 
some discretion and exhibit flexibility. The exercise of 
administrative interpretative discretion may work to the advantage of 
taxpayers directly affected (ie a favourable exercise of discretion is 
adopted by the administrator). In such cases, the general public has 
an interest in ensuring that the administrator is not being unduly 
lenient or non-neutral (or both) in its exercise of this interpretative 
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discretion. Overt recognition of administrative flexibility by the 
Commissioner therefore generates an imperative for alternate means 
of assuring community confidence in the tax administration. Here, 
again, the hand of the neo-liberal discourse can be seen: it is enough, 
it is said, for government to 'transparently' report its actions such 
that government is ultimately held accountable for those actions.74 
As originally conceived, responsive regulation entailed a 
tripartite negotiation of regulatory outcomes between the regulator, 
the regulatee and a community representative.75 The role of the latter 
was to provide assurance to the community that regulatory outcomes 
consonant with the public interest were achieved. However, in the 
context of taxation law, secrecy obligations have dictated the 
adoption of a bipartite model of regulatory negotiation. In such a 
model of discretionary decision making 'behind closed doors', it 
behoves the tax administrator to be very careful to identify and 
explain the basis for any concessional position it adopts, or it could 
damage its legitimacy and detract from the goal of encouraging 
voluntary compliance. Corruption, regulatory capture, incompetence 
and oppressive conduct can all too readily thrive in such an 
environment. Over the short history of the implementation of the 
responsive regulation model within the tax domain, it is therefore no 
surprise that tax administrators in both Australia and New Zealand 
have adopted measures designed to open the processes of tax 
administration to public scrutiny. The public rulings panel, the A TO 
Integrity Adviser/6 the Part IVA panel,77 the public involvement in 
74 Commonwealth of Australia, Making Transparency Transparent (1999). 
75 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 35, 57-8. 
76 Australian Taxation Office, Integrity Framework, above n 73, 9 and 
Commissioner of Taxation, Annual Report 2005- 06 (2006) 208- 9 include some 
basic information regarding membership and the function of the committee. 
However, the annual report does not provide detail of matters considered by the 
committee nor of action items initiated by the committee. 
77 Australian Taxation Office, Practice Statement Law Administration PS LA 
2005124 (2005). 
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the management of test case funding78 and the recent practice of 
publishing (albeit limited) aggregated data regarding tax dispute 
settlements79 are just some instances of ad hoc measures introduced 
in an effort to buttress community confidence. 
It is difficult to see where this accretion of public oversight 
measures will stop, as the Commissioner will continue to face 
pressure to defend every decision making process by introducing 
some measure to assure community confidence in the integrity of the 
tax administration. To illustrate the relentless and ongoing mandate 
for additional information to validate ATO decisions, consider the 
data regarding the settlement of tax disputes which were published 
for the first time in the Commissioner's 2006-07 Annual Report. 
Unfortunately this data provides little information which assists the 
general community in forming a judgment as to the integrity of 
procedures. It would be useful to know, for example, the breakdown 
of the disputes in terms of the particular legislation concerned, the 
profile of the taxpayers concerned (ie small business, individuals by 
income profile, large business, etc), whether the same taxpayers had 
benefited from earlier settlements and to have more information as to 
why the settlement was allowed (ie if for want of information, what 
was the cause of the lack of information with a view to asceliaining 
whether legislative reform is appropriate) .8o 
Introduced as a means of better achieving legislative objectives 
by arming tax officers 'in the field' with a discretion to select the 
78 For details of which, see Australian Taxation Office, Test Case Litigation 
Program: How to Apply for Funding (2005). Note that the operation of this program 
was reviewed by the Inspector-General of Taxation: Inspector-General of Taxation, 
Review of Tax Office Management of Part IVC Litigation: A Report to the Minister 
for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer (2006). 
79 Commissioner of Taxation, above n 76, 171. 
80 Further integrity measures in the context of settlements include Australian 
Taxation Office, Code of Settlement Practice (2007) and the issue of practice 
statements, especially Australian Taxation Office, Practice Statement Law 
Administration PS LA 200715 (2007) and Australian Taxation Office, Practice 
Statement Law Administration PS LA 200716 (2007), identifying the lengths to 
which the ATO has gone in an effOlt to ensure consistency and transparency. 
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most appropriate regulatory response, the cooperative compliance 
model is in danger of collapsing under the weight of more and more 
integrity assurance measures. Rather than being dealt with 'on the 
ground', more and more measures will have to be referred 'up the 
chain of responsibility' for consideration by a quality assurance 
panel. Further, the Commissioner will feel obliged to gather and 
disclose more data in an effort to validate the integrity of his 
decisions. Gathering and publishing such data, installing public 
panels, engaging with the plethora of external review bodies which 
quiz the Commissioner regarding his discretionary authority all add 
to the cost of tax administration. The 'small state' promise of 
responsive regulation is also quite likely to be contested. Although it 
is impossible to compare the administrative compliance costs of one 
tax period to those of another period owing to the infinite variables 
involved, it is at least true to say that Australian administrative 
compliance costs have not declined as a percentage of tax revenue 
raised. 
3.3 Application Issues 
There can be no doubting the force of repeated statements of 
senior ATO staff who uniformly espouse the virtues of the 
partnership paradigm. However, the experience in Australia would 
appear to be that the ATO has been patchy in its application of the 
partnership model. There are a number of causes of this 
phenomenon. 
The first stems from the fact that the cooperative compliance 
model incorporates disparate and sometimes competing imperatives 
at different levels. Thus, at the thematic or discursive level, 
responsive regulation incorporates the often contradictory discourses 
of neo-liberalism and welfarism. Neo-liberals find many aspects of 
the model appealing (as discussed in Part 2.3 above), while welfarists 
also applaud the promise of enhanced revenue arising from efficient 
tax administration. At the pragmatic level, the 'one size fits all' 
dictates of the rule of law are diametrically opposed to the imperative 
of understanding particular taxpayer conduct in its own particular 
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context. Resolution of these conflicts can be no easy task for tax 
administrators at all levels and in quite different contexts. Such 
difficulties are only compounded by the vagaries of the legislation. 
The Commissioner professes reliance upon the legislative purpose,81 
but as discussed above, in many cases this does not provide a firm 
basis for administrative action. It is therefore to be expected that 
differences of approach will exist across a tax administration agency. 
The second cause is that the ATO is experiencing difficulty in 
having the model accepted at all levels within the organisation and in 
all contexts.82 It bears repeating that responsive regulation constitutes 
a massive cultural shift, particularly for an organisation which, daily, 
encounters egregious tax minimising behaviour. It would therefore 
be understandable for some ATO operatives to adopt a posture of 
resigned acceptance of the new partnership paradigm. For some ATO 
operatives, and perhaps just in some contexts, the partnership model 
might be mere rhetoric to be employed in the adversarial combat in 
which they are engaged with the profession. There also would appear 
to be a cohort of the profession who are reluctant to acknowledge 
any duty to the system and so are hardly likely to embrace the spirit 
of a partnership relationship with the ATO. To them, the partnership 
rhetoric is simply a subterfuge or strategy to further the interests of 
their clients. 
However, it also appears that the concern for integrity discussed 
above has meant that field officers may be unable or reluctant to 
implement the responsive regulation model. Interviews with 
Australian practitioners suggest that internal policies and structures 
within the ATO restrict the authority of lower level staff to provide 
the flexibility and decision making ability necessary for the effective 
implementation of the partnership model. 83 
81 Australian Taxation Office, Integrity Framework, above n 73, 8. 
82 Elizabeth Kazi, 'ATO Ignores Criticism, Plays It Tough', The Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 10 November 2006,59. 
83 See the discussion below, and see also comments by the President of the Taxation 
Institute of Australia in Andrew Mills, 'President's Report: Moving towards an 
Efficient and Effective Tax System - Improving Our Members' Experience with 
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Whilst the ATO's administrative and interpretative discretions 
referred to earlier provide the basis for the flexibility mandated by 
the partnership model, a third source of application difficulties may 
be the real or perceived limits of these discretions. The 
Commissioner has acknowledged the limitations of his discretionary 
powers to enter into negotiated and practical outcomes with 
taxpayers and the profession.84 A failure to respond to practitioner 
concerns on the basis of an absence of power is invariably 
accompanied with the refrain that the ATO only applies the law 
made by Parliament. Yet on other occasions the ATO may not 
appear as restrained.85 This inconsistency generates tensions and 
fuels the calls for greater transparency, itself a stress point given 
privacy and confidentiality constraints. Nevertheless, it is conceded 
that the ATO's discretionary powers do have limits, albeit that they 
are poorly defined. 
The fourth cause is that the introduction of the responsive 
regulation model has not been guided by a carefully developed 
policy which was the subject of open consultation and which is the 
centrepiece of the ATO administrative model. Rather, different 
aspects of responsive regulation have been dealt with on an ad hoc 
basis as various crises have emerged. The result is that it must be 
extremely difficult for ATO staff to have a clear understanding of the 
meaning of responsive regulation, its operational incidents, the 
threats and benefits which it poses and the ATO efforts to respond to 
the threats and maximise the benefits. This is not to say that there is 
the ATO' (2006) 41 Taxation in Australia 133, 133 ('Our members' experience 
shows that the level at which ATO officers have discretion or ability to give advice 
and make decisions, is not as high as it once was ... many tasks have to be referred 
elsewhere for action ') . 
84 Michael D'Ascenzo, 'Consolidation: Making Choices - Risk Management in 
Action ' (Paper presented at the 2004 Corporate Tax Association Convention, 
Sydney, 3 May 2004). 
85 An excellent example is provided by the recent Australian Taxation Office, 
Practice Statement Law Administration PS LA 2007111 (2007), where the ATO 
outlines circumstances where the superannuation guarantee charge will not be 
imposed upon late payment of contributions notwithstanding the express recognition 
that the legislation confers it with no discretion in this regard. 
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no publicly available ATO literature regarding its adoption of 
responsive regulation, but it is to say that that literature is fragmented 
and incomplete. Thus, promoting voluntary compliance is the centre 
of the Commissioner's compliance strategy,86 while assuring 
community confidence in the integrity of the tax administration is 
dealt with in the Commissioner's annual reports and an assortment of 
other publications, ranging from practice statements to speeches 
delivered by senior ATO staff. A coherent and current statement of 
what responsive regulation means to ATO practice and management 
would be extremely beneficial in enhancing the homogeneity of 
responsive regulation throughout the ATO. 
4. CONCLUSION: WHERE DOES THE FUTURE OF 
THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL LIE? 
Intuitively, the partnership model of tax administration promises 
much more than any adversarial model in terms of tax system 
efficiency. However, the preceding discussion of the partnership 
model illustrates the point that it is not possible to draw a clear 
dichotomy between an adversarial model and a partnership model. 
Rather, it has been suggested that there are emanations of 
adversarialism within the partnership model which threaten to 
destabilise that model and undennine the efficiency gains that 
simplistic depictions of the model might suggest. Thus, for example, 
the indeterminacy of taxation law undermines the mutuality of 
purpose that the concept of a partnership connotes. In the absence of 
the guiding hand proffered by mutual agreement upon a common 
object, myriad factors will play upon the minds of actors in shaping 
their actions. In this dynamic environment it is reasonable to expect 
that individual self-interest or state predatory rule will prevail, but 
the existence of contest will call into question the accuracy of the 
partnership model. 
The fact that the pmtnership model cannot rid itself of 
adversarial contests suggests that future, independent research should 
86 Australian Taxation Office, Compliance Program, above n l3. 
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be directed towards assessing the experience of the partnership 
model ' on the ground'. As discussed at the end of Part 3 above, 
preliminary discussions with tax practitioners in both Australia and 
New Zealand suggest that the operation of the partnership model 
presents significant challenges. These challenges might be 
categorised as cultural or ideological (or both), and also systemic. 
Further research needs to be undertaken with a view to assessing the 
relative significance of these challenges as threats to the 
sustainability of the partnership model. 
As suggested by the discussion of the ideological drivers behind 
the partnership model in Part 2 above, the partnership model 
answered many of the concems of an emergent neo-liberal 
philosophy. However, neo-liberalism posits the opposition of the 
individual and the state, and therefore threatens the viability of the 
partnership model. The extent to which the opposition between state 
and individual has been moderated by the partnership model is 
therefore crucial to the success of the partnership model. If 
adversarialism remains as a significant force in shaping the 
relationship between taxpayers and tax administrators, the future of 
the partnership model must be assessed. On the other hand, if the 
partnership model has dampened adversarialism, a critical review of 
the mechanisms that have achieved this ideological shift would 
represent a significant contribution to the tax administration literature 
and also to the literature of social science more generally. 
The systemic challenge to the partnership model centres upon the 
existence of administrative discretion which the partnership model 
proposes, but which the twin forces of the rule of law and 
administrative accountability reject. Further research is required with 
a view to identifying the extent to which the partnership model 
actually allows administrative discretion at all levels of the tax 
administration and the success of accountability systems in assuring 
administrative probity in the exercise of that discretion. 
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